Das Forschungsseminar der Fakultät findet mittwochs von 16.30 bis 17.30 Uhr via Zoom statt. Der Zugang wird über die Mailingliste verschickt.
|05.05.2021||Prof. Dr. Fabian Herweg, U Bayreuth|
|Prices versus Quantities with Morally Concerned Consumers (joint work with Klaus M. Schmidt) |
It is widely believed that an environmental tax (price regulation) and cap-and-trade (quantity regulation) are equally efficient in controlling pollution when there is no uncertainty. We show that this is not the case if some consumers (firms, local governments) are morally concerned about pollution and the pollution price is constrained to be inefficiently low. Emissions are lower and material welfare is higher with price regulation. Furthermore, quantity regulation gives rise to dysfunctional incentive and distribution effects. It shifts the burden of adjustment to the poor and discourages voluntary efforts to reduce pollution, while price regulation makes these efforts effective.
|19.05.2021||Prof. Dr. Nora Szech, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)|
|Choice Architecture and Incentives Increase COVID-19 Vaccine Intentions and Test Demand (joint work with Marta Serra-Garcia) |
Willingness to vaccinate and test are critical in the COVID-19 pandemic. We study the effects of two measures to increase vaccination and testing: "choice architecture" and monetary compensations. Choice architecture has the goal of "nudging" people into a socially desired direction without affecting their choice options. Compensations reward vaccine takers and are already in use by some organizations. Yet there is the concern that compensations may decrease vaccination if compensations erode intrinsic motivation to vaccinate. We show that both approaches, compensations and choice architecture, significantly increase COVID-19 test and vaccine demand. Yet, for vaccines, low compensations can backfire.