Multilateral Bargaining with Information Spillovers ( Caio Lorecchio (Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT and CREB), Vladimir Asriyan (CREI, ICREA, BSE and CEPR), William Fuchs (UT Austin and CEPR) )

We study dynamic monopoly pricing with multiple buyers whose valuations are private but correlated, so that one buyer’s purchase decision reveals information about others. In the absence of seller commitment, these information spillovers fundamentally reshape demand: higher prices reduce current trade but can raise posterior beliefs about remaining demand, generating strategic complementarities and non-monotone demand. This interaction between prices, beliefs, and trading behavior gives rise to equilibrium multiplicity and overturns classic results in dynamic monopoly pricing. Information spillovers have an ambiguous effect on the seller's effective commitment power: they can either discipline delay and sustain high prices or undermine commitment by inducing distortions in early trade. When spillovers are sufficiently strong, a continuum of equilibria emerges, spanning outcomes with sharply different implications for efficiency and surplus extraction. In some equilibria, spillovers enable the seller to extract nearly full surplus at the cost of inefficiently low trade; in others, they sustain low prices, expand trade, and shift surplus to buyers. As a result, revenue and welfare are generically non-monotonic---and may move either together or in opposite directions---as spillovers increase. We characterize how information-driven linkages across buyers shape market outcomes, with implications for data investment, market segmentation, and the regulation of data-driven pricing.

Jun. Prof. Benedikt Ballensiefen (Köln)

Demand for Dollars: Evidence from Survey Expectations (joint with Fabricius Somogyi and Hannah Winterberg)

We study the determinants of US dollar demand across market participants and traded instruments using survey-based exchange rate and macroeconomic expectations. Leveraging granular foreign exchange (FX) trading data and forward looking expectations, we present three results. First, currency investors increase their dollar holdings when expecting US dollar appreciation or improved US macroeconomic fundamentals, whereas synthetic dollar funding is driven by forecasted deviations from covered interest parity. Second, cross-sectionally, investors rebalance along the factor structure of currency risk into dollars following an expected dollar appreciation. Third, the predictive power of professional forecasts weakens when uncertainty or forecaster disagreement rises. Our findings demonstrate that long-horizon expectations accurately predict dollar demand across spot, swap, and forward currency markets. To rationalise these empirical findings, we develop a model of currency demand.