|10.04.2019||Jan Bena, University of British Columbia|
|Shielding Firm Value: Employment Protection and Process Innovation |
We show that an increase in labor dismissal costs leads firms to increase their process innovation, especially in industries with a large share of labor costs. Firms with a greater stock of knowledge capital adjust their production methods and mitigate the effects of increased labor rigidity. They exhibit larger increases in process innovation, larger decreases in employment and employment growth rates, and larger increases in capital intensity. These adjustments allow them to increase labor productivity, operating performance, and ultimately to avoid value losses.
|24.04.2019||Tim Eisert, Erasmus School of Economics Rotterdam|
Credit Misallocation and (Dis-) Inflation: Evidence from Europe (with Viral Acharya, Matteo Crosignani, and Christian Eufinger)
|15.05.19||Jan Marcus, Universität Hamburg|
|Start: 18:00|| |
Sports Club Vouchers and Children’s Health Behavior
|05.06.2019||Heiko Jacobs, Universität Duisburg-Essen|
|12.06.2019||Rainer M. Rilke, WHU-Otto Beisheim School of Management|
|Peer selection and performance - Evidence from a field experiment |
We investigate whether the mechanism by which peers are assigned influences students' educational performance. In a business school class, work groups are either endogenously formed or assigned randomly. During the semester, groups have to work on two tasks that contribute to their final grade. Results from the first wave show that group performance is significantly better when groups are assigned randomly. When groups are formed endogenously, students more often match with students of similar ability, of the same gender, and with whom they knew before. Moreover, we observe a positive relationship between one's pro-sociality and ability of one's match but no assortative matching on pro-sociality. Individual exam performance is not significantly different between endogenously and randomly matched students.
|26.06.2019||Edgar Preugschat, TU Dortmund|
Regional labor mobility and optimal taxation
|03.07.2019||Stephan Müller, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen|
|The Evolution of Morals under Indirect Reciprocity |
We study the coexistence of strategies in the indirect reciprocity game where agents have access to second-order information. We fully characterize the evolutionary stable equilibria and analyze their comparative statics with respect to the cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs involving two strategies and one for higher CBR's which involves two additional strategies. We thereby offer an explanation for the coexistence of different moral judgments among humans. Both equilibria require the presence of second-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for higher-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. In a laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of subjects play strategies that belong to the predicted equilibrium set. Furthermore, varying the CBR across treatments leads to changes in the distribution of strategies that are in line with theoretical predictions.
|10.07.2019||Nicolas Klein, University of Montreal|
|Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games (with Johannes Hörner and Sven Rady) |
We analyze the continuous-time limit of a discrete-time experimentation game with Lévy bandits. We show that free-riding can be mitigated or even completely overcome in non-Markovian equilibria. If players’ payoffs have an informative diffusion component, efficiency can be asymptotically achieved in perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Otherwise, asymptotic efficiency is possible if and only if lump-sum payoffs are not too informative about the state of the world. In all cases, it is asymptotically without loss to focus on strongly symmetric equilibria as far as average payoffs are concerned.